[{"id":19660,"title":"Analytics and Operations Young Scholar Workshop 2024","permalink":"https:\/\/bschool.nus.edu.sg\/biz-events\/event\/analytics-and-operations-young-scholar-workshop-2024\/","category":"Seminars and talks","event_dept":{"value":"analytics-operations","label":"Analytics & Operations"},"event_sec_dept":false,"event_details":{"event_start_date":"1  March  2024","event_end_date":"1  March  2024","event_start_time":"10:00 am","event_end_time":"6:05 pm","event_dress_code":"NA"},"event_loc":{"eve_address_selection":"5","eve_location_1":{"eve_org":"NUS Business School","eve_build":"Mochtar Riady Building","eve_room":"3-2","eve_add":"15 Kent Ridge Drive","eve_count":"Singapore","eve_copos":119245,"eve_map_url":"https:\/\/goo.gl\/maps\/Q1kyjwxHNE22"},"eve_location_2":{"eve_org":"Shaw Foundation Alumni House","eve_build":"","eve_room":"Clove and Lemongrass Room Level 2","eve_add":"11 Kent Ridge Drive","eve_count":"Singapore","eve_copos":119244,"eve_map_url":"https:\/\/goo.gl\/maps\/docgThkDWFxKdb9c7"},"eve_location_3":{"eve_org":"Hon Sui Sen Memorial Library Auditorium","eve_build":"","eve_room":"","eve_add":"1 Hon Sui Sen Drive","eve_count":"Singapore","eve_copos":117588,"eve_map_url":"https:\/\/goo.gl\/maps\/NJjWK4RMpC92"},"eve_location_4":{"eve_org":"NUSS Kent Ridge Guild House","eve_build":"","eve_room":"Dalvey Room","eve_add":"9 Kent Ridge Drive","eve_count":"Singapore","eve_copos":119241,"eve_map_url":"https:\/\/goo.gl\/maps\/nXn2Luh96pH2"},"eve_location_5":{"eve_org":"Institute of Data Science","eve_build":"Innovation 4.0","eve_room":"I4-01-03 (Level 1 Seminar Room)","eve_add":"3 Research Link","eve_count":"Singapore","eve_copos":"117602","eve_map_url":"https:\/\/goo.gl\/maps\/i1xocvvDh27QUXem7"},"eve_location_6":{"eve_org":"","eve_build":"","eve_room":"","eve_add":"","eve_count":"","eve_copos":"","eve_map_url":""},"eve_location_7":""},"event_introduction":"","event_short_intro":"","event_topic":null,"event_banner":false,"event_external_url":"","event_registration_details":{"event_registration_form":false,"event_registration_message":"","event_registration_deadline":null,"eve_registration_url":"","event_form":"","event_registration_ack":""},"event_speaker":[{"event_speaker_name":"Yifan Feng","event_speaker_designation":"Assistant Professor, NUS Bussiness School","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/bizfaculty.nus.edu.sg\/faculty-details\/?profId=632","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Kimon Drakopoulos","event_speaker_designation":"Associate Professor of Data Sciences and Operations, USC Marshall School of Business","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/www.kimondrakopoulos.com\/","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Yvonne Huijun Zhu","event_speaker_designation":"PhD Student, NUS IORA","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/iora.nus.edu.sg\/people-p\/zhu-huijun\/","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Zhi Chen","event_speaker_designation":"Assistant Professor, NUS Business School","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/bizfaculty.nus.edu.sg\/faculty-details\/?profId=633","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Pascale Crama","event_speaker_designation":"Professor of Operations Management, SMU Lee Kong Chian School of Business","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/business.smu.edu.sg\/faculty\/profile\/6666\/crama-pascale","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Zhaoxuan Wei","event_speaker_designation":"PhD Student, NUS IORA","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/iora.nus.edu.sg\/people-p\/wei-zhaoxuan\/","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Long Zhao","event_speaker_designation":"Assistant Professor, NUS Business School","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/bizfaculty.nus.edu.sg\/faculty-details\/?profId=586","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Ilia Tsetlin","event_speaker_designation":"Professor of Decision Sciences, INSEAD","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/www.insead.edu\/faculty\/ilia-tsetlin","event_speaker_introduction":""},{"event_speaker_name":"Lan Wu","event_speaker_designation":"PhD Student, NUS Business School","event_speaker_affiliation":"","event_speaker_picture":false,"event_speaker_url":"https:\/\/bschool.nus.edu.sg\/analytics-operations\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/73\/2022\/08\/CV_WuLan.pdf","event_speaker_introduction":""}],"event_agenda":false,"event_photo_gallery":false,"event_presentations":false,"event_custom_heading":[{"event_custom_title":"Paper 1","event_custom_details":"<p><strong>Presenter<\/strong>: Yifan Feng, Assistant Professor, NUS Bussiness School<\/p>\n<p><strong>Discussant<\/strong>: Kimon Drakopoulos, Associate Professor of Data<br \/>\nSciences and Operations, USC Marshall School of Business<\/p>\n<p><strong>Learning to Rank under Strategic &#8220;Brush Wars&#8221;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Abstract:<br \/>\nWe consider a dynamic learning and ranking problem of a digital<br \/>\nplatform. Uninformed of the products&#8217; intrinsic qualities, the platform<br \/>\nstrives to design a sequential ranking policy that learns from historical<br \/>\ntraffic data while accounting for potential manipulation by sellers to<br \/>\ninflate their performances, which we refer to as &#8220;brushing.&#8221; Are there<br \/>\neffective yet simple ranking algorithms to combat manipulative ranking<br \/>\nbrushing?<br \/>\nWe provide a positive answer by proposing a simple ranking algorithm,<br \/>\ntermed Experiment-Then-Commit (ETC). We study the sellers&#8217;<br \/>\nstrategic responses to the ranking algorithm by formulating an<br \/>\nN-player-T-period &#8220;brush war&#8221; game. We first show that the dynamic<br \/>\ngame admits a static reduction through a dominant-strategy argument.<br \/>\nThen for every fixed N, we characterize the game&#8217;s asymptotic<br \/>\nbehavior when T is large. We show the nonexistence of pure strategy<br \/>\nequilibria, shedding light on the possibility of efficiency loss. However,<br \/>\nfor a large market where N is infinite, a different pattern emerges. We<br \/>\nformulate a novel non-atomic game with a continuum of sellers and<br \/>\ncharacterize a &#8220;self-reinforcing&#8221; market equilibrium. Under this<br \/>\nequilibrium, the seller&#8217;s brushing amount increases in the product&#8217;s<br \/>\nquality. In other words, the sellers&#8217; strategic responses &#8220;reinforce&#8221;<br \/>\ncomplete learning of the platform. As a result, ETC can be highly<br \/>\neffective even under sellers&#8217; manipulative ranking brushing. We also<br \/>\ndiscuss the managerial implications.<\/p>\n"},{"event_custom_title":"Paper 2","event_custom_details":"<p><strong>Presenter<\/strong>: Yvonne Huijun Zhu, PhD Student, NUS IORA<\/p>\n<p><strong>On the Value of Flexibility in Adaptive Experiments<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Abstract:<br \/>\nAdaptive experimentation refers to the practice of changing (improving)<br \/>\nthe experiment configurations on the fly based on observed data.<br \/>\nWhile it can potentially increase sample efficiency, it potentially needs<br \/>\nstrong flexibility as an experimenter and thus may be difficult to<br \/>\nimplement in practice.<br \/>\nTo explore the interplay between sample efficiency and flexibility in<br \/>\nadaptive experiments, we formulate a Bayesian sequential hypothesis<br \/>\ntesting problem. The goal is to minimize the sum of sampling and<br \/>\npenalty costs under different levels of flexibility. Here, flexibility is<br \/>\ndefined as the number of times one can change the experiments. We<br \/>\nshow that there is a notable gap between &#8220;No Flexibility&#8221; (where<br \/>\nexperiments cannot be changed) and &#8220;Full Flexibility&#8221; (where<br \/>\nexperiments can be freely changed adaptively). Nevertheless, the gap<br \/>\ncan be (asymptotically) closed by just allowing to change the<br \/>\nexperiment once. That is achieved by an experimentation rule we<br \/>\ndevelop, termed Nested SPRT, which is both simple to derive in closed<br \/>\nform and easy to implement.<\/p>\n"},{"event_custom_title":"Paper 3","event_custom_details":"<p><strong>Presenter<\/strong>: Zhi Chen, Assistant Professor, NUS Business School<\/p>\n<p><strong>Discussant<\/strong>: Pascale Crama, Professor of Operations Management,<br \/>\nSMU Lee Kong Chian School of Business<\/p>\n<p><strong>The Value of Private Feedback in Trial-and-error Innovation<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>Contests<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Abstract:<br \/>\nFirms have increasingly turned to innovation contests as a means of<br \/>\nprocuring complex industrial innovations from their supplier base. At<br \/>\nthe start of the contest, the buyer announces the innovation challenge<br \/>\nand the award in the form of a valuable supply contract. To address the<br \/>\nchallenge, it is common that suppliers adopt the trial-and-error<br \/>\napproach to develop solutions, and then submit them to the buyer for<br \/>\nevaluation as the contest progresses. In some contests, the buyer<br \/>\nprivately reveals the interim performance of developed solutions to the<br \/>\nsuppliers during the trial-and-error process (private feedback), but in<br \/>\nothers, the buyer withholds such information (no feedback). Motivated<br \/>\nby such divergent practices, we seek to understand whether providing<br \/>\nprivate feedback (or not) results in higher profits for the buyer. We find<br \/>\nthat when there is no urgent need for faster time-to-market, providing<br \/>\nprivate feedback is more profitable for the buyer when either there are<br \/>\nmany evaluation rounds or when the cost of a trial is high. We further<br \/>\nuncover two sources of the value of private feedback: it incentivizes<br \/>\nsuppliers to conduct more trials (\u201cquantity effect&#8221;) in a more efficient<br \/>\nway (\u201cquality effect&#8221;). In contrast, no feedback results in higher profits<br \/>\nfor the buyer when there are few evaluation rounds and when the cost<br \/>\nof a trial is low. On the contrary, when the faster time-to-market is a<br \/>\nmajor concern for the buyer, we show that private feedback becomes<br \/>\nless attractive, and the buyer prefers suppliers to conduct parallel trials<br \/>\n(no feedback) particularly when the cost of a trial is very low or high, or<br \/>\nwhen the competition is intense with a large number of suppliers. Our<br \/>\nresults have direct managerial implications and help shed light on<br \/>\nvarious feedback policies used in practice.<\/p>\n"},{"event_custom_title":"Paper 4","event_custom_details":"<p><strong>Presenter<\/strong>: Zhaoxuan Wei, PhD Student, NUS IORA<\/p>\n<p><strong>Partial Backorder Inventory System: Asymptotic Optimality and<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>Demand Learning<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Abstract:<br \/>\nWe develop a unified stochastic inventory model that not only captures<br \/>\nthe impatience feature for unmet demands but also integrates the<br \/>\nclassic backlogging and lost-sales inventory models. For such model,<br \/>\nwhen both demand and patience distributions are known, we establish<br \/>\nthe uniform (asymptotic) optimality of the base-stock policy. While the<br \/>\nbacklogged demands become unobservable (demand is partially<br \/>\nobservable and patience is unobservable), we introduce a novel policy<br \/>\nfamily that operates without backlogged demands information, and<br \/>\nprove this proposed policy can approach the cost efficiency of the<br \/>\noptimal policy in the system when the demand and patience<br \/>\ndistributions are known. Further we extend our analysis to an online<br \/>\ninventory control problem in which precise data on demand and<br \/>\npatience distributions are unobservable and only sales are observable<br \/>\nby developing a UCB-type algorithm that yields a near-optimal policy.<br \/>\nThe regret bounds given by the algorithm are provably tight within the<br \/>\nplanning horizon, and are comparable to the state-of-the-art results in<br \/>\nthe literature, even in the face of partial and biased observations and<br \/>\nweaker system ergodicity.<\/p>\n"},{"event_custom_title":"Paper 5","event_custom_details":"<p><strong>Presenter<\/strong>: Long Zhao, Assistant Professor, NUS Business School<\/p>\n<p><strong>Discussant<\/strong>: Ilia Tsetlin, Professor of Decision Sciences, INSEAD<\/p>\n<p><strong>Predicting Tail Quantiles Through Aggregation of Medians: Model<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>and Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Abstract:<br \/>\nQuantile forecasts are essential inputs for decision making under<br \/>\nuncertainty. The most useful quantiles are from the tails since tails<br \/>\nprovide rich information about the underlying uncertainty. However,<br \/>\ndirectly predicting tail quantiles is challenging for human experts and<br \/>\neven quantitative models. On the other hand, non-tail quantiles such<br \/>\nas medians are easier to predict directly but are less useful in<br \/>\nuncertainty assessment. Motivated by this mismatch, we study how a<br \/>\ndecision maker can predict tail quantiles through aggregation of<br \/>\nnon-tail quantile forecasts (such as medians). Intuitively, we want to<br \/>\nshift the median forecasts by the true difference between median and<br \/>\ntail quantiles. However, this task is challenging because the underlying<br \/>\nrandomness is unknown, and the median forecasts are subject to<br \/>\nbiases and noises. Our method involves aggregation of median<br \/>\nforecasts to achieve a substantial reduction of noise and leveraging<br \/>\npast data to correct the biases and estimate the shift. We evaluate our<br \/>\nproposed method using the M5 uncertainty competition submissions<br \/>\nand find that our method outperforms established benchmarks in the<br \/>\nliterature. We also offer a theoretical understanding of why our method<br \/>\nperforms well empirically.<\/p>\n"},{"event_custom_title":"Paper 6","event_custom_details":"<p><strong>Presenter<\/strong>: Lan Wu, PhD Student, NUS Business School<\/p>\n<p><strong>Mitigating the Spiral Down Effect: Online Learning under<\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>Mixed-fare Structure<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Abstract:<br \/>\nIn the dynamic landscape of airline revenue management, accurately<br \/>\npredicting customer behavior and adjusting ticket-selling strategies in<br \/>\nthe face of fluctuating demand is critical. Traditional models frequently<br \/>\noverlook intricate customer buy-down patterns, resulting in a<br \/>\ndetrimental downward spiral of revenue decline. This study combines<br \/>\nthe adjusted fare concept with the Bayes Selector algorithm to create<br \/>\nan innovative approach for optimizing airline ticket-selling strategies<br \/>\nunder mixed fare structure. By dynamically adjusting fare structures<br \/>\nbased on purchase probabilities and expected profits, and utilizing<br \/>\nprobabilistic estimates and learning capabilities of the Bayes Selector<br \/>\nalgorithm, this integrated methodology enables airlines to adaptively<br \/>\nrefine their seat allocation strategy for maximum profitability.<br \/>\nOur findings show that a constant regret is attainable for the problem<br \/>\nunder the (independent) differentiated product demand setting. More<br \/>\ninterestingly, we establish a logarithmic regret bound in the case of<br \/>\nmixed fare structure. To validate these results, we provide a simple<br \/>\nanalysis of how estimation errors in the probabilities of the types (of<br \/>\ncustomers) is managed in the online seat allocation algorithm.<br \/>\nFurthermore, we illustrate the practical application of our approach<br \/>\nthrough a real-world airline scenario. This study concludes that by<br \/>\nlearning and adapting to the nuances of customer behavior, airlines<br \/>\ncan significantly enhance their revenue management capabilities,<br \/>\nleading to more accurate demand estimation and seat allocation<br \/>\nstrategy in alignment with the existing environment.<\/p>\n"}],"event_enquiry_details":{"event_enq_full_name":"","event_enq_department":"","event_enq_email":"","event_enq_telephone":"","event_enq_website":""}}]