# A Gravity Model of International Lending: 

## Trade, Default and Credit

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Key Idea: Mechanism to ensure Sovereign Debt Repayment
has implications for Lending Patterns

- Few penalties for sovereign default other than reduced
trade
- If trade is the penalty, then lending patterns should follow trade patterns


## Theory

- Construct 3-country model of debt with 1 debtor, 2 creditors from countries with different trade patterns
- Penalty for default is proportional to trade
- Show lending is proportional to trade


## Data Set

- Use annual panel data set of trade and lending
- 20 creditors, 149 debtors, 1986-1999
- Bank claims from BIS
o Rest from Glick-Rose


## Methodology

- Estimate "gravity" model of lending:

$$
\ln \left(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{ijt}}\right)=\varphi \ln \left(\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{ijt}}\right)+\beta \mathrm{Z}_{\mathrm{ijt}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{ijt}}
$$

where Z are gravity variables (distance, GDP, ...)

- IV critical because of simultaneity
- Use different instrumental variables from gravity model, especially geographic (landlocked status ...)


## Table 1: OLS Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims

|  | $\varphi$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Default | $.54(.04)$ |
| Without controls | $.75(.02)$ |
| Levels | . .0001 |
|  | $(.00003)$ |
| Levels without controls | .0001 |
|  | $(.00003)$ |
| 1990 | $.51(.05)$ |
| 1995 | $.53(.07)$ |
| Only industrial debtors | $.74(.04)$ |

Equation estimated is Claims $\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{t}}=\varphi \operatorname{Trade}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\beta \mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}$
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.
Intercepts and year effects not recorded.

Table 2a: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims, Geographic Instruments

|  | $\varphi$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Default | $.41(.07)$ |
| Without controls | $.50(.04)$ |
| Levels | .00006 |
|  | $(.00001)$ |
| Levels without controls | .00007 |
|  | $(.00002)$ |
| 1990 | $.52(.10)$ |
| 1995 | $.40(.10)$ |
| Only industrial debtors | 1.03 |
|  | $(.07)$ |

Equation estimated is Claims $\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{t}, \mathrm{t}}=\varphi \operatorname{Trade}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\beta \mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}$
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.
Intercepts and year effects not recorded.
Instrumental variables for trade are: distance; land border; number landlocked; number island nations; log of area.

Table 2b: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims, Excludable Instruments

|  | $\varphi$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Default | $.80(.40)$ |
| Without controls | $.83(.07)$ |
| Levels | .00004 |
|  | $(.00001)$ |
| Levels without controls | .00005 |
|  | $(.00001)$ |
| 1990 | $.59(.37)$ |
| 1995 | 1.13 |
|  | $(.49)$ |
| Only industrial debtors | $.79(.29)$ |

Equation estimated is Claims ${ }_{i, j, t}=\varphi$ Trade $_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\beta \mathrm{Z}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}$
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.
Intercepts and year effects not recorded.
Instrumental variables for trade are: common language; regional trade agreement; same nation.

Table 3: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade on Claims, Controlling for Total Claims/Debt

| Control: | Total <br> Claims | Total <br> Debt |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Default | $.40(.07)$ | $.42(.07)$ |
| Without controls | $.42(.04)$ | $.27(.04)$ |
| Levels | .00005 <br> $(.000004)$ | .00006 <br> $(.00002)$ |
| Levels without controls | .00005 <br> $(.000006)$ | .00006 <br> $(.00002)$ |
| 1990 | $.47(.10)$ | $.56(.09)$ |
| 1995 | $.37(.10)$ | $.42(.10)$ |
| Only industrial debtors | $.48(.23)$ | $1.10(.20)$ |
| OLS | $.29(.03)$ | $.39(.02)$ |

Equation estimated is Claims $\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{t}}=\varphi$ Trade $_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\beta \mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}$
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.
Intercepts and year effects not recorded.
Instrumental variables for trade are: distance; land border; number landlocked; number island nations; log of area.

Table 4: IV Estimates of Effect of Trade Level on Claims, Panel Estimators

| Estimator: | OLS, RE | OLS, FE | IV, RE |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Default | $.31(.01)$ | $.19(.02)$ | $.52(.06)$ |
| Without controls | $.38(.01)$ | $.19(.01)$ | $.52(.03)$ |
| Levels | .00003 | .00002 | .00006 |
|  | $(.000001)$ | $(.000001)$ | $(.00001)$ |
| Levels without controls | .00003 | .00002 | .00007 |
|  | $(.000001)$ | $(.000001)$ | $(.000003)$ |
| Only industrial debtors | $.46(.06)$ | $.28(.07)$ | $.96(.19)$ |

Equation estimated is Claims $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}=\varphi \operatorname{Trade}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\beta \mathrm{W}_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}+\varepsilon_{\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{j}, \mathrm{t}}$
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs) recorded in parentheses.
Intercepts and year effects not recorded.
Instrumental variables for trade are: distance; land border; number landlocked; number island nations; log of area.

