Do We Really Know that the WTO increases Trade?

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NBER and CEPR

Question

• What is the effect of the multilateral system on international trade?

<u>Answer</u>

- GATT and WTO have negligible effect
- GSP has a large positive effect (doubles trade)

The Line

Answer to title question is negative:

We don't really know the WTO increases (or the GATT increased) trade!

Technical Summary

- Use ordinary bilateral "gravity" model of trade
 - o Also use aggregate data with same results
- Large panel data set: annual data 1948-1999 for 178 "countries"
- Find effects of GATT/WTO membership in one/both countries are economically small, often negative, statistically insignificant
 - o GSP does affect trade, so methodology/data not to blame
- Robust results

Motivation

- Many believe that trade is enhanced by multilateral system
 - o Part of reason why trade has grown faster than income?

- WTO's objective:
 - o "Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible."

WTO quotations:

"... The achievements of the system are well worth celebrating. Since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade began operating from Geneva in 1948, world merchandise trade has increased 16 fold ... world trade now grows roughly three times faster than merchandise output ... this advance ranks among the great international economic achievements of the post-world war era ..."

"The past 50 years have seen an exceptional growth in world trade. Merchandise exports grew on average by 6% annually. Total trade in 2000 was 22-times the level of 1950. GATT and the WTO have helped to create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing to unprecedented growth."

<u>Literature</u>

Gravity Model

$$\begin{split} &ln(X_{ijt}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 lnD_{ij} + \beta_2 ln(Y_iY_j)_t + \beta_3 ln(Y_iY_j/Pop_iPop_j)_t + \beta_4 Lang_{ij} + \beta_5 Cont_{ij} \\ &+ \beta_6 Landl_{ij} + \beta_7 Island_{ij} + \beta_8 ln(Area_iArea_j) + \beta_9 ComCol_{ij} + \beta_{10} CurCol_{ijt} \\ &+ \beta_{11} Colony_{ij} + \beta_{12} ComNat_{ij} + \beta_{13} CU_{ijt} + \beta_{14} FTA_{ijt,} + \Sigma_t \varphi_t T_t \\ &+ \gamma_1 Bothin_{ijt} + \gamma_2 Onein_{ijt} + \gamma_3 GSP_{ijt} + \epsilon_{ijt} \end{split}$$

where i and j denotes trading partners, t denotes time.

Estimation: OLS with year effects, robust standard errors

Parameters of Interest: γ_1 , γ_2 , and γ_3

Data Set

- Trade data from IMF's *Direction of Trade*
 - o Real US\$
 - o 178 trading entities, most global trade covered
 - o 1948-1999 (with gaps)
 - o Average (4 measures of) bilateral exports and imports
- PWT, WDI, IFS for population, GDP
- CIA's website

Multilateral Data

- WTO website for GATT/WTO accession
- Began in 1948 (covered 32 entities)
 - o 1960: 50 "contracting parties"
 - 0 1970: 90
 - o 1990: 112
 - o Now: 158 with 29 "observers"
- GSP bilateral preferences from UN's Operation and Effects of the

Generalized System of Preferences

o Interpolate from 1974, 1979, 1984 (data imperfect)

Descriptive Statistics

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Correlation with Both in GATT/WEO | Correlation with One in GATT/WEO | Correlation with GSP |
|--------------------------|-------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| Log Real Trade | 10.06 | 3.34 | .12 | 08 | .24 |
| Both in GATT/WTO | .49 | .50 | 1. | 83 | .16 |
| One in GATT/WTO | .42 | .49 | 83 | 1. | 06 |
| GSP | .23 | .42 | .16 | 06 | 1. |
| Log Distance | 8.16 | .81 | .04 | .02 | .14 |
| Log product Real GDP | 47.88 | 2.68 | .19 | 10 | .27 |
| Log product Real GDP p/c | 16.03 | 1.50 | .13 | 05 | .35 |
| Regional FTA | .01 | .12 | .03 | 04 | 03 |
| Currency Union | .01 | .12 | .04 | 04 | 06 |
| Common Language | .22 | .42 | .04 | 07 | 06 |
| Land Border | .03 | .17 | 02 | 02 | 09 |
| Number Landlocked | .25 | .47 | .01 | 01 | .03 |
| Number Islands | .34 | .54 | .04 | 02 | .00 |
| Log product Land Area | 24.21 | 3.28 | 02 | .02 | .04 |
| Common Colonizer | .10 | .30 | .02 | 03 | 18 |
| Currently Colonized | .002 | .04 | .04 | 04 | 01 |
| Ever Colony | .02 | .14 | .04 | 03 | .08 |
| Common Country | .0003 | .02 | .02 | 01 | 00 |

234,597 observations.

Albania Diibouti Latvia Saudi Arabia Dominica Lebanon Senegal Algeria Angola Dominican Rep. Lesotho Seychelles Antigua and Barbuda Ecuador Liberia Sierra Leone Argentina Egypt Libya Singapore Armenia El Salvador Lithuania Slovak Republic Australia Equatorial Guinea Luxembourg Slovenia

Estonia Macedonia Solomon Islands Austria Azerbaijan Ethiopia Madagascar Somalia Bahamas Fiji Malawi South Africa Bahrain Finland Malaysia Spain Bangladesh France Maldives Sri Lanka Barbados Gabon Mali St. Kitts & Nevis Belarus Gambia Malta St. Lucia

Belgium Georgia Mauritania St. Vincent & Gren.

Belize Germany Mauritius Sudan Benin Ghana Mexico Suriname Greece Moldova Swaziland Bermuda Bhutan Grenada Mongolia Sweden Morocco Switzerland Bolivia Guatemala Botswana Guinea Mozambique Syria Namibia Brazil Guinea-Bissau Tajikistan Bulgaria Guyana Nepal Tanzania Burkina Faso Haiti Netherlands Thailand Burma (Myanmar) Honduras New Zealand Togo Burundi Tonga Hong Kong Nicaragua

Cambodia Hungary Niger Trinidad & Tobago

Cameroon Iceland Nigeria Tunisia Canada India Norway Turkey Cape Verde Indonesia Oman Turkmenistan Central African Rep. Uganda Iran Pakistan Chad Ukraine Iraq Panama


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Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) Kenya Reunion Vietnam
Croatia Kiribati Romania Yemen, Republic of


Croatia Kritoati Komania Tenien, Republic of Cyprus Korea, South (R) Russia Yugoslavia, Socialist Fed. Rep. of

Czech RepublicKuwaitRwandaZambiaDenmarkKyrgyz RepublicSamoaZimbabwe

Lao People's Dem. Rep. Sao Tome & Principe



Event Study: Bilateral Trade and GATT/WTO entry



Event Study: Aggregate Openness and GATT/WTO entry

Table 1: Benchmark Results

| Table 1. Beller | Default | No | Post '70 | With |
|-----------------|---------|------------|-----------|---------|
| | 2010010 | Industrial | 1 050 . 0 | Country |
| | | Countries | | Effects |
| Both in | 04 | 21 | 08 | .15 |
| GATT/WTO | (.05) | (.07) | (.07) | (.05) |
| One in | 06 | 20 | 09 | .05 |
| GATT/WTO | (.05) | (.06) | (.07) | (.04) |
| GSP | .86 | .04 | .84 | .70 |
| | (.03) | (.10) | (.03) | (.03) |
| Log | -1.12 | -1.23 | -1.22 | -1.31 |
| Distance | (.02) | (.03) | (.02) | (.02) |
| Log product | .92 | .96 | .95 | .16 |
| Real GDP | (.01) | (.02) | (.01) | (.05) |
| Log product | .32 | .20 | .32 | .54 |
| Real GDP p/c | (.01) | (.02) | (.02) | (.05) |
| Regional | 1.20 | 1.50 | 1.10 | .94 |
| FTA | (.11) | (.15) | (.12) | (.13) |
| Currency | 1.12 | 1.00 | 1.23 | 1.19 |
| Union | (.12) | (.15) | (.15) | (.12) |
| Common | .31 | .10 | .35 | .27 |
| Language | (.04) | (.06) | (.04) | (.04) |
| Land | .53 | .72 | .69 | .28 |
| Border | (.11) | (.12) | (.12) | (.11) |
| Number | 27 | 28 | 31 | -1.54 |
| Landlocked | (.03) | (.05) | (.03) | (.32) |
| Number | .04 | 14 | .03 | 87 |
| Islands | (.04) | (.06) | (.04) | (.19) |
| Log product | 10 | 17 | 10 | .38 |
| Land Area | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.03) |
| Common | .58 | .73 | .52 | .60 |
| Colonizer | (.07) | (.07) | (.07) | (.06) |
| Currently | 1.08 | | 1.12 | .72 |
| Colonized | (.23) | | (.41) | (.26) |
| Ever | 1.16 | 42 | 1.28 | 1.27 |
| Colony | (.12) | (.57) | (.12) | (.11) |
| Common | 02 | | 32 | .31 |
| Country | (1.08) | | (1.04) | (.58) |
| Observations | 234,597 | 114,615 | 183,328 | 234,597 |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | .65 | .47 | .65 | .70 |
| RMSE | 1.98 | 2.36 | 2.10 | 1.82 |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Notes:

- 1. Model works well
- 2. GATT/WTO membership has small effects
- 3. GSP has big effect
- 4. Robustness

Table 2: Cross-Sectional Analysis

| Table 2. Cluss-Section | iai Aliaiysis | | |
|------------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------|
| | Both in GATT/WTO | One in GATT/WTO | GSP |
| 1950 | .59 | .21 | |
| | (.12) | (.09) | |
| 1955 | .64 | .30 | |
| | (.11) | (.09) | |
| 1960 | .40 | .07 | |
| | (.10) | (.07) | |
| 1965 | .23 | .13 | |
| | (.07) | (.07) | |
| 1970 | 15 | 04 | .40 |
| | (.10) | (.10) | (.23) |
| 1975 | 33 | 16 | .92 |
| | (.11) | (.11) | (.05) |
| 1980 | 09 | .02 | .90 |
| | (.11) | (.11) | (.05) |
| 1985 | .18 | .15 | .80 |
| | (.15) | (.16) | (.06) |
| 1990 | .58 | .43 | .76 |
| | (.20) | (.21) | (.05) |
| 1995 | 50 | 66 | .59 |
| | (.21) | (.21) | (.05) |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with intercept not reported.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Allowing the Effects to vary over GATT rounds

| | OLS, Year | OLS, Year | Fixed Country- | Fixed Country- |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------|----------------|
| | Effects | Effects | Pair Effects | Pair Effects |
| GATT Regime | Both in | One in | Both in | One in |
| | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO |
| Before Annecy | 1.17 | .43 | .76 | .08 |
| Round (1949) | (.62) | (.56) | (.35) | (.25) |
| Annecy to | .26 | .14 | .34 | .11 |
| Torquay Round (1951) | (.12) | (.09) | (.09) | (.06) |
| Torquay to | .12 | .14 | .35 | .14 |
| Geneva Round (1956) | (.10) | (.09) | (.04) | (.03) |
| Torquay to | 02 | .03 | .24 | .10 |
| Dillon Round (1961) | (.09) | (.07) | (.04) | (.03) |
| Dillon to | 09 | 05 | .26 | .11 |
| Kennedy Round (1967) | (.06) | (.06) | (.03) | (.02) |
| Kennedy to | 14 | 05 | .06 | .04 |
| Tokyo Round (1979) | (.07) | (.07) | (.02) | (.02) |
| Tokyo to | .19 | .05 | 07 | 09 |
| Uruguay Round (1994) | (.09) | (.09) | (.02) | (.02) |
| After Uruguay | 85 | 80 | .18 | .14 |
| Round | (.12) | (.12) | (.02) | (.03) |

Regressand: log real trade.

OLS: robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Table 4: Allowing the Effects to vary by Region and Income Class

| Tuble 4. Timowing the | Both in | One in | GSP |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|-------|
| | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO | GSI |
| Default | 04 | 06 | .86 |
| | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| South Asia | .93 | .67 | .86 |
| | (.40) | (.39) | (.11) |
| East Asia | .02 | 13 | .60 |
| | (.12) | (.10) | (.10) |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 29 | 28 | .97 |
| | (.10) | (.09) | (.06) |
| Middle-East or North | 16 | 01 | 1.05 |
| Africa | (.12) | (.08) | (.09) |
| Latin America or | .10 | .13 | .93 |
| Caribbean | (.08) | (.07) | (.06) |
| High Income | 26 | 20 | .48 |
| | (.09) | (.08) | (.04) |
| Middle Income | 05 | 02 | .93 |
| | (.06) | (.05) | (.04) |
| Low Income | 38 | 37 | 1.11 |
| | (.08) | (.08) | (.05) |
| Least Developed | 34 | 21 | 1.09 |
| | (.11) | (.10) | (.07) |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported).

Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Table 5: Sample Sensitivity Analysis

| Table 3. Sample Sensi | | 0 . | CCD |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|------------|
| | Both in | One in | GSP |
| | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO | |
| Data before 1980 | .01 | .01 | .88 |
| | (.05) | (.05) | (.04) |
| Data after 1979 | 04 | 08 | .81 |
| | (.08) | (.08) | (.04) |
| Only Industrial | .47 | .19 | 40 |
| Countries | (.22) | (.22) | (.09) |
| No African | 06 | 08 | .70 |
| Countries | (.07) | (.06) | (.04) |
| No Latin or | 10 | 16 | .64 |
| Caribbean countries | (.06) | (.06) | (.04) |
| No OPEC | 17 | 17 | .80 |
| Countries | (.06) | (.06) | (.03) |
| No RTA | 05 | 07 | .84 |
| Observations | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| Without Poorest Quartile | .15 | .14 | .73 |
| of real GDP p/c | (.07) | (.06) | (.03) |
| Without Smallest | .21 | .16 | .69 |
| Quartile of real GDP | (.06) | (.06) | (.03) |
| Without 30 | 07 | 07 | .79 |
| Outliers | (.05) | (.04) | (.03) |
| Only Canadian | 01 | | .32 |
| Observations | (.13) | | (.15) |
| Only American | .06 | | .28 |
| Observations | (.11) | | (.14) |
| Only British | .16 | | 22 |
| Observations | (.10) | | (.12) |
| Only French | .21 | | .23 |
| Observations | (.09) | | (.13) |
| Only Italian | .02 | | .08 |
| Observations | (.10) | | (.13) |
| Only German | 16 | 20 | 16 |
| Observations | (.26) | (.23) | (.13) |
| Only Japanese | 39 | 40 | .32 |
| Observations | (.36) | (.31) | (.15) |
| D | | 1 - (-1 | . 1) 1 . 1 |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported) unless noted.

Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Table 6: Estimation Sensitivity Analysis

| Table 6. Estimation Sensit | Both in GATT/WTO | One in GATT/WTO | GSP |
|---|------------------|-----------------|-------|
| With Quadratic | 02 | 02 | .86 |
| Gravity terms | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| Without Year Effects | 53 | 33 | .47 |
| | (.06) | (.05) | (.03) |
| Dis-aggregated Regional | 03 | 06 | .83 |
| Trade Agreements | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| Controlling for Aggregate | 08 | 16 | .50 |
| Third-Country Trade | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| 5-yr averages | 06 | 07 | .89 |
| | (.06) | (.05) | (.03) |
| Random Effects (GLS) | 07 | 06 | .04 |
| Estimator | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| Fixed Effects (Within) | .15 | .05 | .11 |
| Estimator | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| Random Effects (GLS) | .11 | .03 | .30 |
| Estimator with Years | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| Fixed Effects (Within) | .13 | .06 | .18 |
| Estimator with Years | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| Treatment MLE : Both | 20 | | .74 |
| members vs. neither | (.07) | | (.04) |
| Treatment MLE : One | | 26 | 1.19 |
| member vs. neither | | (.07) | (.05) |
| Median | 51 | 30 | .27 |
| Regression | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| Weighted | 03 | 05 | .84 |
| Least Squares | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| Tobit | 64 | 41 | .58 |
| | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| With Lagged | 03 | 02 | .10 |
| Dependent Variable | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| Arellano-Bond | .12 | .02 | .35 |
| Dynamic Panel Degrace and log real trade OLS w | (.04) | (.04) | (.02) |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported) unless noted.

Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Table 7: Dynamic Analysis

| Estimator | OLS | Prais- Winsten | Prais- Winsten | Random Effects | Random Effects | Random Effects |
|------------------|-------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| Autocorrelation | | .83 | .83 | | .66 | .66 |
| Coefficient | | | | | | |
| Both in GATT/WTO | 07 | .09 | .09 | .11 | .13 | .13 |
| | (.05) | (.03) | (.04) | (.02) | (.03) | (.03) |
| One in GATT/WTO | 07 | .03 | .03 | .03 | .04 | .04 |
| | (.05) | (.03) | (.03) | (.02) | (.03) | (.02) |
| Accession | .22 | | .00 | 04 | | 02 |
| 5 years ago | (.03) | | (.01) | (.02) | | (.02) |
| Accession | .43 | | .04 | .08 | | .04 |
| 10 years ago | (.03) | | (.01) | (.03) | | (.02) |
| Accession | .47 | | .01 | .10 | | .00 |
| 15 years ago | (.03) | | (.01) | (.03) | | (.02) |
| Accession | .66 | | .04 | .22 | | .05 |
| 20 years ago | (.03) | | (.01) | (.03) | | (.02) |

Regressand: log real trade.

Standard errors in parentheses (robust for OLS and Prais-Winsten).

Table 8: Perturbations of the Gravity Model

| Table 8: Pertu | rbations of | the Gravity | y Model | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------------|---------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Both in | 04 | .14 | 1.23 | | | .02 |
| GATT/WTO | (.05) | (.05) | (.08) | | | (.05) |
| One in | 06 | 02 | .46 | | | 02 |
| GATT/WTO | (.05) | (.05) | (.07) | | | (.05) |
| GSP | .86 | .74 | 2.17 | .86 | .88 | .85 |
| | (.03) | (.03) | (.07) | (.03) | (.03) | (.03) |
| Neither in | ` / | ` / | \ / | .05 | ` ' | ` / |
| GATT/WTO | | | | (.05) | | |
| 1 Founder | | | | (100) | .22 | |
| of GATT | | | | | (.04) | |
| 2 Founders | | | | | .46 | |
| of GATT | | | | | (.10) | |
| Min. Years | | | | | .001 | |
| In GATT/WTO | | | | | (.001) | |
| Max. Years | | | | | 007 | |
| In GATT/WTO | | | | | (.002) | |
| Both in | | | | | (.002) | 59 |
| IMF | | | | | | (.10) |
| One in | | | | | | 36 |
| IMF | | | | | | (.10) |
| Log | -1.12 | -1.27 | | -1.12 | -1.13 | -1.12 |
| Distance | (.02) | (.02) | | (.02) | (.02) | (.02) |
| Log product | .92 | .79 | | .92 | .91 | .92 |
| Real GDP | (.01) | (.01) | | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| | .32 | .45 | | .32 | .32 | .32 |
| Log product | | (.01) | | | (.01) | |
| Real GDP p/c | (.01) 1.20 | (.01) | | (.01) 1.20 | 1.18 | (.01) 1.20 |
| Regional FTA | (.11) | | | | | |
| | 1.12 | | | (.11) 1.12 | (.11) 1.11 | (.11) 1.11 |
| Currency Union | (.12) | | | (.12) | (.12) | (.12) |
| Common | .31 | | | .31 | .29 | .32 |
| Language | (.04) | | | (.04) | | |
| Language | .52 | | | .52 | (.04) .52 | (.04) |
| Border | (.11) | | | (.11) | (.11) | (.11) |
| Number | 27 | | | 27 | 27 | 29 |
| Landlocked | (.03) | | | (.03) | (.03) | (.03) |
| Number | .04 | | | .04 | .00 | .04 |
| | | | | | | |
| Islands Log product | (.04) 10 | | | (.04) 10 | 10 | (.04) 10 |
| Log product Land Area | (.01) | | | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| | .58 | | | .59 | .57 | .59 |
| Common Colonizer | (.07) | | | (.07) | (.07) | (.07) |
| | 1.08 | | | 1.08 | .85 | .92 |
| Currently | | | | | | |
| Colonized | (.23) | | | (.23) | (.26) | (.23) 1.17 |
| Ever | 1.16 | | | 1.16 | 1.11 | |
| Colony | (.12) | | - | (.12) | (.12) | (.12) |
| Common | 02 | | | 02 | 07 | .17 |
| Country | (1.08) | (2 | 10 | (1.08) | (1.10) | (1.08) |
| R ² | .65 | .63 | .12 | .65 | .65 | .65 |
| RMSE | 1.98 | 2.04 | 3.13 | 1.98 | 1.98 | 1.98 |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). 234,597 observations. Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Appendix 3a: Aggregate Openness and the GATT/WTO

| | Member of | Log | Log | Remoteness | R^2 |
|--------------|-------------|---------|------------|------------|-------|
| | GATT/WTO | Real | population | remoteness | |
| | G1117 VV 10 | GDP | population | | |
| | | per | | | |
| | | capita | | | |
| | 11 | Corpios | | | .12 |
| | (.02) | | | | |
| | 01 | .13 | 22 | -1.86 | .53 |
| | (.01) | (.01) | (.004) | (.39) | |
| With Extra | 00 | .13 | 16 | 51 | .56 |
| Controls* | (.01) | (.01) | (.006) | (.44) | |
| Without | 01 | | | | .00 |
| year | (.02) | | | | |
| Effects | | | | | |
| Without | .032 | .16 | 21 | -5.92 | .47 |
| year | (.014) | (.01) | (.003) | (.34) | |
| Effects | | | | | |
| Without | .006 | .15 | 14 | -4.96 | .51 |
| year | (.015) | (.01) | (.006) | (.39) | |
| Effects, | | | | | |
| Extra | | | | | |
| Controls* | | | | | |
| Level of | -5.95 | | | | .08 |
| Openness | (1.12) | | | | |
| Level of | 21 | 9.61 | -12.63 | 82.5 | .40 |
| Openness | (.92) | (.52) | (.26) | (33.2) | |
| Level of | 58 | 9.65 | -4.59 | 243 | .48 |
| Openness, | (1.01) | (.50) | (.59) | (36) | |
| Extra | | | | | |
| Controls* | | | | | |
| Remoteness | .00 | .12 | 22 | -1547. | .53 |
| using levels | (.01) | (.01) | (.004) | (390) | |

Regressand: log of openness (i.e., ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in percent) unless noted.

Data from PWT6; 158 countries, 1950-1998; 5499 observations unless noted.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported).

^{* &}quot;Extra Controls" are: a) currency union dummy; b) dependency dummy; c) log of area; d) island dummy; and e) landlocked dummy. Extra controls reduce observations to 4803.

Appendix 3b: Aggregate Openness, Tariffs, and the GATT/WTO

| | Member of | Log | Log | Remoteness | Tariffs | \mathbb{R}^2 |
|----------------|-----------|--------|------------|------------|---------|----------------|
| | GATT/WTO | Real | population | | | |
| | | GDP | | | | |
| | | per | | | | |
| | | capita | | | | |
| | 02 | .06 | 23 | -1.52 | 010 | .51 |
| | (.02) | (.01) | (.01) | (.58) | (.001) | |
| Without | 03 | .07 | 22 | -3.32 | 010 | .49 |
| year | (.02) | (.01) | (.01) | (.53) | (.001) | |
| Effects | | | | | | |
| Level of | .79 | 4.65 | -15 | 125 | 64 | .36 |
| Openness | (1.66) | (.75) | (.6) | (61) | (.10) | |

Regressand: log of openness (i.e., ratio of exports plus imports to GDP in percent). Data from PWT6; 158 countries, 1970-1998; 2099 observations.

OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported).

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Tariffs are import duties as percentage of imports, taken from WDI 2002.

Appendix 4: Instrumental Variable Estimates of the GATT/WTO Effect

| | | | IV Estimate | IV Estimate | R ² from | R ² from |
|--------|--------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | | | γ_1 | γ_2 | First-Stage | First-Stage |
| | Functional | Instrumental | Both in | One in | Both in | One in |
| | Form of IVs | Variables | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO | GATT/WTO |
| Whole | Log product | 1: Democracy, Polity | 8.4 | 14 | .18 | .08 |
| Sample | | | (3.5) | (6.4) | | |
| Whole | Log product | 2: Freedom, Civil, | -12.4 | -21 | .14 | .07 |
| Sample | | Political Rights | (5.9) | (9.2) | | |
| Whole | Log product | 1 + 2 (Dem'y, Pol'y, | -15.0 | -24 | .18 | .09 |
| Sample | | Free., Civil, Pol'l) | (7.5) | (11.5) | | |
| Whole | Sum | 1: Democracy, Polity | 9.3 | 16 | .17 | .07 |
| Sample | | | (5.4) | (10.1) | | |
| Whole | Sum | 2: Freedom, Civil, | -7.2 | -12.6 | .14 | .07 |
| Sample | | Political Rights | (3.0) | (4.4) | | |
| Whole | Sum | 1 + 2 (Dem'y, Pol'y, | -7.0 | -12.0 | .17 | .09 |
| Sample | | Free., Civil, Pol'l) | (2.8) | (4.2) | | |
| 1950 | Log products | 1: Democracy, Polity | 3.1 | 11.6 | .26 | .03 |
| | | | (3.5) | (28) | | |
| 1960 | Log products | 1: Democracy, Polity | 52 | -150 | .21 | .03 |
| | | | (2000) | (6,000) | | |
| 1970 | Log products | 1: Democracy, Polity | 1.1 | 4 | .10 | .03 |
| | | | (4.9) | (9.9) | | |
| 1980 | Log products | 1: Democracy, Polity | -43 | -70 | .16 | .06 |
| | | | (300) | (500) | | |
| 1990 | Log products | 1: Democracy, Polity | 900 | 13,000 | .17 | .10 |
| | | | (60,000) | (87,000) | | |

Regressand: log real trade.

IV: robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Instrumental variables: Set 1: log product (sum) of two countries': a) democracy, and b) polity scores. Set 2: log product (sum) of two countries'; a) political rights; b) civil rights; c) freedom scores.

Regressors not recorded: GSP; regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log product real GDP; log product real GDP p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common colonizer; currently colonized; ever colony; and common country; year intercepts.

Appendix 5: The Effect of WTO/GATT Membership on Exporters and Importers

| | Both in GATT/WTO | Only Exporter in GATT/WTO | Only Importer in GATT/WTO | GSP |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------|
| OLS | .01 | .01 | 12 | .76 |
| | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| OLS with equal GDP exporter | .01 | .12 | 25 | .76 |
| and importer coefficients | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | (.03) |
| Fixed Effects | .07 | .06 | 06 | .17 |
| | (.02) | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |
| | .06 | .02 | 10 | .27 |
| Random Effects | (.02) | (.02) | (.02) | (.01) |

Regressand: log real exports from one country to the other. 387,780 observations.

Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

Regressors not recorded: regional FTA; currency union; log distance; log exporter real GDP; log exporter real GDP p/c; log importer real GDP p/c; common language; land border; number landlocked; number islands; log product land area; common colonizer; currently colonized; ever colony; common country; and year effects.

Appendix 6: Adding Tariffs to the Benchmark Model

| Appendix 6: Add | | | | iark Moc | | | | |
|---|--------|---------|--------|----------|--|--|--|--|
| Both in | .09 | .05 | .08 | .06 | | | | |
| GATT/WTO | (.11) | (.11) | (.11) | (.11) | | | | |
| One in | .02 | .00 | .03 | .01 | | | | |
| GATT/WTO | (.11) | (.11) | (.11) | (.11) | | | | |
| GSP | .68 | .68 | .66 | .54 | | | | |
| | (.04) | (.04) | (.04) | (.04) | | | | |
| Log | -1.24 | -1.24 | -1.25 | -1.22 | | | | |
| Distance | (.03) | (.03) | (.03) | (.03) | | | | |
| Log product Real | .94 | .94 | .94 | .91 | | | | |
| GDP | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | | | | |
| Log product Real | .45 | .42 | .47 | .39 | | | | |
| GDP p/c | (.02) | (.02) | (.02) | (.02) | | | | |
| Regional | .58 | .54 | .84 | .57 | | | | |
| FTA | (.13) | (.13) | (.15) | (.18) | | | | |
| Currency | 1.24 | 1.21 | 1.17 | 1.19 | | | | |
| Union | (.19) | (.19) | (.20) | (.19) | | | | |
| Common | .41 | .42 | .43 | .53 | | | | |
| Language | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | | | | |
| Land | .46 | .47 | .51 | .51 | | | | |
| Border | (.14) | (.14) | (.15) | (.15) | | | | |
| Number | 16 | 19 | 12 | 15 | | | | |
| Landlocked | (.04) | (.04) | (.04) | (.04) | | | | |
| Number | .06 | .07 | .07 | .20 | | | | |
| Islands | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | | | | |
| Log product | 08 | 07 | 07 | 04 | | | | |
| Land Area | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | | | | |
| Common | .54 | .59 | .58 | .61 | | | | |
| Colonizer | (.09) | (.09) | (.09) | (.09) | | | | |
| Currently | .69 | .63 | 1.06 | .81 | | | | |
| Colonized | (1.30) | (1.31) | (1.16) | (1.20) | | | | |
| Ever | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.10 | .90 | | | | |
| Colony | (.12) | (.12) | (.13) | (.13) | | | | |
| Sum of | | 0053 | | | | | | |
| Tariffs | | (.0009) | | | | | | |
| Log product | | | | 14 | | | | |
| Of Tariffs | | | | (.01) | | | | |
| Observations | 78,254 | 78,254 | 69,859 | 69,859 | | | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | .71 | .71 | .69 | .69 | | | | |
| RMSE | 1.86 | 1.85 | 1.90 | 1.89 | | | | |
| Decreased learned trade OLS with your effects (intercents not reported) | | | | | | | | |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported). Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses. Tariffs are import duties as percentage of imports, taken from WDI 2002.

Appendix 7: Other Measures of Trade Policy in the Benchmark Model

| Both in GATT/WTO | 39 | 76 | 46 | .11 | .15 | 10 | 09 |
|-----------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------|-------|--------|--------|
| | (.14) | (.14) | (.13) | (.20) | (.20) | (.12) | (.12) |
| One in GATT/WTO | 55 | 77 | 57 | 12 | 14 | 16 | 15 |
| | (.14) | (.14) | (.14) | (.16) | (.15) | (.11) | (.11) |
| GSP | .52 | .46 | .48 | N/a | N/a | .10 | .12 |
| | (.04) | (.03) | (.04) | | | (.11) | (.11) |
| Sum of Economic Freedom | | 76 | | | | | |
| Indices | | (.03) | | | | | |
| Sum of IEF Trade Policy sub- | | | 23 | | | | |
| indices | | | (.01) | | | | |
| Sum of Dollar's Price Distortions | | | | | 1.52 | | |
| | | | | | (.35) | | |
| Sum of Black Market Premia | | | | | | | 11 |
| | | | | | | | (.04) |
| Observations | 21,935 | 21,935 | 21,935 | 7,412 | 7,412 | 26,912 | 26,912 |

Regressand: log real trade. OLS with year effects (intercepts not reported).

Robust standard errors (clustering by country-pairs) in parentheses.

More Technical Issues

- Reverse Causality biases coefficients up
- Little *measurement error* with respect to accession dates
- Little evidence of trade *diversion* (or *creation!*)
- Missing trade data: Heckman's "treatment methodology"
 - o Also missing output: possibly more serious

Summary of Different Estimates

- 80 estimates of γ_1
 - o Mean: .05
 - o Median: .02
 - o 39 negative
 - o 4 greater than .69 (doubling)
 - 1 w/o gravity, other 3 insignificant at .01
 - o 71% t-statistics<2.5

Why Has Trade Grown Faster than Income if not GATT?

- Different question but possibly:
 - o Higher productivity in tradables
 - o Falling transport costs
 - o Regional trade associations
 - o Converging tastes
 - o Changing factor endowments
 - o Growing liquidity