DIVERSITY ACTION COMMITTEE SINGAPORE



Centre for Governance, Institutions & Organisations NUS Business School

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## Resolving the Performance Puzzle of Board Gender Diversity

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Status of board gender diversity in Singapore

- Board gender representation
- Board practices
- Performance impact of board gender diversity
  - Gender impact on governance
  - Governance impact on performance
  - Resolution of performance puzzle
- Application issues


## Inspiration: Back-of-Envelope

#### Singapore Governance & Transparency Index (SGTI 2017)

	Has Woman on Board of Directors	No Woman on Board of Directors
SGTI Score*	50.4	45.9


\* Score is average for all SGX-listed companies excluding REITs and Business Trusts over 5 years

## **Board Gender Diversity in Singapore**



#### **Board Gender Representation: Trend**

#### Women Directors on Boards of SGX-listed companies



## **Board Gender Representation: Comparison**

Country	Gender Representation On Boards	Data Population	Date	
Norway*	42.1%	All public listed	Dec 2016	
France*	42.0%	CAC 40	Jun 2016	
UK	27.7%	FTSE 100	Oct 2017	
Australia	27.7%	ASX 200	May 2018	
New Zealand	27.0%	S&P/NZX 50	Dec 2017	
Germany*	23.0%	Тор 100	Dec 2016	
USA	21.0%	S&P 500	May 2016	
Malaysia <sup>#</sup>	19.2%	Тор 100	Dec 2017	
India*	15.3%	NSE listed	21 Jun 2018	
Hong Kong	13.8%	HSI 50	2 Jan 2018	
<u>Singapore</u>	<u>13.1%</u>	Top 100 Primary Listed	Dec 2017	
China	12.9%	Тор 100	2014	
Indonesia	11.1%	Тор 100	2014	
Japan	4.5%	Nikkei 225	2016	
South Korea	2.6%	Тор 100	2014	

Source: Diversity Action Committee Singapore

\* Countries with legislated quotas # In Code of Corporate Governance, not legislated


## **Board Practices: Effects on Women on Boards**

## When independent director tenure increases, women representation decreases




## **Board Practices: Effects on Women on Boards**

#### When board chairmen are non-independent, women representation increases for full board but decreases amongst independent directors




Source: CGIO (Singapore data based on ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard as of Dec 2017)

### **Modelling the Performance Impact**



## **Modelling the Performance Impact**



#### Sample

# All SGX-listed companies for 5-year period covering FY ending in 2012 to 2016 (i.e. up to data reported in 2017)

- Sample comprises about 500 companies per year excluding REITs and Business Trusts
- Total sample size is 2,378 observations matched across data sources and pooled across years

## Gender Impact on Governance: Analysis

Depende	ent variable: Corpo	orate governance sc	ore
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Proportion of female directors	6.628 <sup>*</sup>		
Proportion of female independe	ent		
directors		9.773***	
Has women on board	)		2.178**
No. of board meetings held	1.369***	1.327***	1.351***
Board size	2.099***	2.096***	2.012***
Board independence	45.72***	45.13***	45.64***
Market cap (mil S\$)	0.00101***	0.00101***	0.00101***
D/E ratio	0.00164	0.00205	0.00209
P/E ratio	-0.000183	-0.000172	-0.000114
Constant	4.685*	5.119*	4.958*
R <sup>2</sup>	0.378	0.382	0.380
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.376	0.379	0.377
F	139.2***	141.4***	140.1***
		*	<i>p</i> < 0.05, ** <i>p</i> < 0.01, *** <i>p</i> < 0.001

Source: Loh, L., Nguyen, M.H. (2018). Board Diversity and Business Performance in Singapore-Listed Companies: The Role of Corporate Governance. RJSSM: Volume 7, Number 10, pages 95-104.


Note: Corporate governance score is taken from the SGTI score (https://bschool.nus.edu.sg/cgio/our-research/sgti)

## Gender Impact on Governance: Interpretation

Variables	Impact on Corporate Governance
Proportion of women directors	Positively significant
Proportion of women independent directors	Positively significant
Has women on board	Positively significant

## Gender Impact on Governance: Interpretation

Board gender diversity has positive impact on corporate governance



#### **Governance Impact on Performance: Analysis**

	Dep	endent varia	able: Return	on equity	<u> </u>		
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
CG score	0.117*		0.120*		0.115*		0.121*
Proportion of female directors Proportion of female independent directors		-5.500	-6.331	3.710	2.593		
Has women on board						-1.283	-1.548
No. of board meetings	-0.231	-0.0889	-0.247	-0.0881	-0.236	-0.0748	-0.232
Board size	1.209**	1.450***	1.194**	1.460***	1.215**	1.504***	1.257**
Board independence	-12.99	-7.439	-12.99	-7.813	-13.08	-7.422	-13.02
Market Cap (mil S\$)	- 0.000137	- 0.0000130	- 0.000133	- 0.000024 2	- 0.000139	- 0.0000135	- 0.000134
D/E ratio	0.0809***	0.0809***	0.0806***	0.0814***	0.0811***	0.0807***	0.0804***
P/E ratio	-0.00315	-0.00323	-0.00321	-0.00315	-0.00313	-0.00325	-0.00324
Constant	2.095	3.279	2.754	2.593	2.035	2.949	2.383
R <sup>2</sup>	0.099	0.096	0.099	0.096	0.099	0.096	0.099
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.095	0.092	0.094	0.092	0.094	0.092	0.094
F	24.78***	24.12***	21.78***	24.09***	21.70***	24.12***	21.79***
					* p < 0.05	ō, ** <i>p</i> < 0.01, ***	<i>p</i> < 0.001

Source: Loh, L., Nguyen, M.H. (2018). Board Diversity and Business Performance in Singapore-Listed Companies: The Role of Corporate Governance. RJSSM: Volume 7, Number 10, pages 95-104.

## **Governance Impact on Performance: Interpretation**

Variables	Impact on Financial Performance (ROE)
Corporate governance score	Positively significant
Proportion of women directors	Insignificant
Proportion of women independent directors	Insignificant
Has women on board	Insignificant


#### **Governance Impact on Performance: Analysis**

$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$			Depen	dent variabl	e: Tobin's O	<u> </u>		
Proportion of female directors   0.0348   0.00261     Proportion of female independent directors   0.602 <sup>***</sup> 0.559 <sup>***</sup> Has women on board meetings   0.0259   0.0326 <sup>*</sup> 0.0259   0.0308 <sup>*</sup> 0.0250   0.03 0.038 <sup>*</sup> No. of board meetings   0.0476 <sup>***</sup> 0.0578 <sup>***</sup> 0.0476 <sup>***</sup> 0.0581 <sup>***</sup> 0.0490 <sup>***</sup> 0.05     Board size   0.0476 <sup>***</sup> 0.0578 <sup>***</sup> 0.0476 <sup>****</sup> 0.0581 <sup>***</sup> 0.0490 <sup>***</sup> 0.05     Board independence   -0.138   0.0838   -0.138   0.04002   -0.157   0.07     Market Cap (mil S\$)   0.0000052   0.0000020   0.0000052   0.0000021   0.0000052   0.0000052   0.0000052   0.00000118   8   1     D/E ratio   -0.000227   -0.000219   -0.000227   -0.000177   -0.000186   -0.00     P/E ratio   0.621 <sup>***</sup> 0.643 <sup>***</sup> 0.621 <sup>***</sup> 0.630 <sup>***</sup> 0.607 <sup>***</sup> 0.63     R <sup>2</sup> 0.031   0.025   0.031   0.033   0.038   0.02		(1)				(5)	(6)	(7)
directors 0.0348 0.00261   Proportion of female independent directors 0.602*** 0.559***   Has women on board 0.0259 0.0326* 0.0259 0.0308* 0.0250 0.03   No. of board meetings 0.0476*** 0.0578*** 0.0476*** 0.0581*** 0.0490*** 0.05   Board size 0.0476*** 0.0578*** 0.0476*** 0.0581*** 0.0490*** 0.05   Board independence -0.138 0.0838 -0.138 0.0402 -0.157 0.07   Market Cap (mil S\$) 0.0000052 0.0000022 0.0000052 - - - - -   D/E ratio -0.000227 -0.000219 -0.000227 -0.000177 -0.000186 -0.00   P/E ratio 0.621*** 0.643*** 0.621*** 0.630*** 0.607*** 0.63   R <sup>2</sup> 0.031 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.038 0.02	CG score	0.00485**		0.00485**		0.00438**		0.00476**
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $		e	0.0348	0.00261				
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	independent	e			0.602***	0.559***		
meetings $0.0259$ $0.0326$ $0.0259$ $0.0308$ $0.0250$ $0.038$ Board size $0.0476^{***}$ $0.0578^{***}$ $0.0476^{***}$ $0.0581^{***}$ $0.0490^{***}$ $0.05$ Board independence $-0.138$ $0.0838$ $-0.138$ $0.0402$ $-0.157$ $0.07$ Market Cap (mil S\$) $0.0000052$ $0.000002$ $0.0000052$ $0.0000052$ $0.0000052$ $0.0000052$ D/E ratio $-0.000227$ $-0.000219$ $-0.000227$ $-0.000177$ $-0.000186$ $-0.00027$ P/E ratio $0.0000849$ $0.0000841$ $0.0000850$ $0.0000880$ $0.0000888$ $0.0000880$ Constant $0.621^{***}$ $0.643^{***}$ $0.621^{***}$ $0.630^{***}$ $0.630^{***}$ $0.637^{***}$ R <sup>2</sup> $0.031$ $0.025$ $0.031$ $0.033$ $0.038$ $0.02$	Has women on boa	ard					0.0510	0.0406
Board size $0.0476^{***}$ $0.0578^{***}$ $0.0476^{***}$ $0.0581^{***}$ $0.0490^{***}$ $0.0581^{***}$ Board independence $-0.138$ $0.0838$ $-0.138$ $0.0402$ $-0.157$ $0.0776^{***}$ Market Cap (mil S\$) $0.0000052$ $0.0000022$ $0.0000052$ $0.0000052$ $0.0000052$ $0.0000052$ D/E ratio $-0.000227$ $-0.000219$ $-0.000227$ $-0.000177$ $-0.000186$ $-0.0000840$ P/E ratio $0.025^{***}$ $0.621^{***}$ $0.630^{***}$ $0.607^{***}$ $0.637^{***}$ R <sup>2</sup> $0.031$ $0.025$ $0.031$ $0.033$ $0.038$ $0.02$		0.0259	0.0326*	0.0259	0.0308*	0.0250	0.0324*	0.0260
Market Cap (mil S\$) 0.0000052 0.0000002 0.0000052 0.0000052 0.0000052 0.0000055 0.000   Market Cap (mil S\$) 0.0000052 0.000002 0.0000052 0.0000052 0.0000055 0.000   D/E ratio -0.000227 -0.000219 -0.000227 -0.000177 -0.000186 -0.00   P/E ratio 0.0000849 0.0000841 0.0000850 0.0000880 0.0000888 0.00   Constant 0.621*** 0.643*** 0.621*** 0.630*** 0.607*** 0.63   R <sup>2</sup> 0.031 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.038 0.02	-	0.0476***	0.0578***	0.0476***	0.0581***	0.0490***	0.0559***	0.0463***
1 9 1 0.00000118 8 1   D/E ratio -0.000227 -0.000219 -0.000227 -0.000177 -0.000186 -0.00   P/E ratio 0.0000849 0.0000841 0.0000850 0.0000880 0.0000888 0.00   Constant 0.621*** 0.643*** 0.621*** 0.630*** 0.607*** 0.63   R <sup>2</sup> 0.031 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.038 0.02	Board independend	ce -0.138	0.0838	-0.138	0.0402	-0.157	0.0796	-0.137
1 9 1 0.00000118 8 1   D/E ratio -0.000227 -0.000219 -0.000227 -0.000177 -0.000186 -0.00   P/E ratio 0.0000849 0.0000841 0.0000850 0.0000880 0.0000888 0.00   Constant 0.621*** 0.643*** 0.621*** 0.630*** 0.607*** 0.63   R <sup>2</sup> 0.031 0.025 0.031 0.033 0.038 0.02		-	-	-		-	-	-
P/E ratio   0.0000849   0.0000841   0.0000850   0.0000880   0.0000888   0.00     Constant   0.621***   0.643***   0.621***   0.630***   0.630***   0.607***   0.63     R <sup>2</sup> 0.031   0.025   0.031   0.033   0.038   0.02	Market Cap (mil S	6) 0.0000052 1		0.0000052 1	- 0.00000118		0.00000046 1	0.0000052 7
Constant   0.621***   0.643***   0.621***   0.630***   0.607***   0.63     R <sup>2</sup> 0.031   0.025   0.031   0.033   0.038   0.02	D/E ratio	-0.000227	-0.000219	-0.000227	-0.000177	-0.000186	-0.000203	-0.000213
R <sup>2</sup> 0.031   0.025   0.031   0.033   0.038   0.025	P/E ratio	0.0000849	0.0000841	0.0000850	0.0000880	0.0000888	0.0000867	0.0000873
	Constant	0.621***	0.643***	0.621***	0.630***	0.607***	0.637***	0.613***
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> 0.027 0.021 0.026 0.029 0.033 0.02	R <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.025	0.031	0.033	0.038	0.026	0.031
	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.027	0.021	0.026	0.029	0.033	0.022	0.027
F 7.338*** 5.943*** 6.417*** 7.797*** 7.822*** 6.10	F	7.338***	5.943***	6.417***	7.797***	7.822***	6.100***	6.507***

Source: Loh, L., Nguyen, M.H. (2018). Board Diversity and Business Performance in Singapore-Listed Companies: The Role of Corporate Governance. RJSSM: Volume 7, Number 10, pages 95-104.


## **Governance Impact on Performance: Interpretation**

Variables	Impact on Financial Performance (Ratio of Market Value to Book Value)		
Corporate governance score	Positively significant		
Proportion of women directors	Insignificant		
Proportion of women independent directors	Positively significant		
Has women on board	Insignificant		



#### Increase in Women Independent Directors (WID) Impacts Ratio of Market Value to Book Value

- Current WID on boards averages 0.23<sup>1</sup>
- Proportion of WIDs of all IDs averages 0.06<sup>2</sup>
- 1 unit change in proportion of WIDs contributes 0.559 increase in ratio of market value to book value



Footnotes:

Based on 5-year pooled sample

## Application Issues

- Linkages: Distinguishing between correlation, regression and causality for performance
- <u>Endogeneity</u>: Chicken-and-egg problem in board gender diversity and corporate governance
- <u>Validity</u>: Prediction range for performance relationship of independent directors
- **Extension**: Why not just have all-women boards?

## **Board Gender Diversity in Singapore**

